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WORLDMARKS AND THE ANTITRUST LAW
RUDOLF CALLMANN*

Like all things, trademark rights can also be exploited for sinister
purposes. A trademark can, for example, be used in violation of the
antitrust laws and no elaborate references need be made to the
legislative history of the Lanham Act 1 to demonstrate that the Act
was "not intended to undermine the anti-trust laws."'2 Certain specific provisions of the Act clearly disclose the legislative intent to
dissuade a trademark owner from using his mark in violation of
the antitrust laws.
As a general provision against antitrust violations by the trademark owner, section 33(b), subsection 7, of the Lanham Act allows
to the defendant in a trademark infringement suit the defense "that
the mark has been or is being used to violate the anti-trust laws of
the United States," thereby applying the doctrine of unclean hands
as originally expanded in patent cases 3 to the trademark case,4 notwithstanding the fact that some doubts have been expressed as to
whether the section was intended only to destroy the incontestability
of a mark rather than to provide an affirmative defense. 5 Other specific provisions designed to discourage antitrust violations relate to
certification and collective marks 6 and to marks of "related companies."7 The trademark as a symbol of goods or a business, functioning as an indication of origin or ownership, as a guarantee and as
an advertisement, 8 is not a "monopoly"; 9 but, even should it be considered such, it has been stated that "it is lawful monopoly,"
* Member of the New York Bar, the law firm of Greene, Pineles, Callmann
& Durr, and the International Committee, United States Trademark Association; Vice-Chairman, Committee on International Copyright and Trademark
Relations, American Bar Association; author of "The Law of Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks" 2nd ed. 1950 with pocket supplement 1956 (5 volumes,
Callaghan & Company, Chicago).
1. Trademark Act of July 5, 1946, 60 STAT. 427, (1946), 15 U.S.C. 1051 (1952),
(hereinafter called the Lanham Act.)
2. Judge Freed, in United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp.
284 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
3. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
4. Cf. Senator O'Mahoney, 92 CONG. REc. 7873 (1946).

5. Congressman Lanham, 92 CONG. REc. 7524 (1946).
6. Lanham Act § 4.

7. Id. § 5.
8. Cf. 3 CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAM CoMpETriON AND TRADE MAaxs

(hereinafter referred to as CALLMANN) § 65 (Supp. 1956).
9. Id. § 66.3. By Professor Chamberlin's theory of monopolistic competition
[CHAMBERLiN,

THE THEORY

OF MONOPoLisTIc

COMPETITION

(1933)]

under

which pure competition requires complete standardization, not only of the
goods, but also of the sellers, and under which the slightest differentiation
constitutes monopoly, "the protection of trademarks from infringement and
of businessmen generally from the imitation of their products known as
'unfair trading' is the production of monopoly"; and "to permit such infringements and imitations would be to purify competition by eliminating monopoly
elements."
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the monopoly of a creator, something which is not and never has been
within the prohibition of any law, anti-trust or otherwise. On the con-,
trary, that monopoly is encouraged by patent, trademark and copyright
statutes, and the rules of unfair competition.O
It does not tend to foster monopoly to sustain the right, if one has
acquired it, to the exclusive use of a trademark. The establishment of
such a right does not restrain in any degree the manufacture or sale by
others of the article or commodity to which the trademark is attached.
It is simply the protection of property. By granting such protection, the
law enables the public to exercise a free choice between two products,
and compels competing products to be sold without deception as to
their source of production and manufacture.11
True, even a superficial scanning of a series of trademark cases will
reveal attempts to claim trademark rights for words that are wholly
incapable of serving a trademark's function. However, an excessive
claim to exclusive rights in words, colors, forms, etc., which should be
freely available for all competitors, e.g., descriptive or generic words,
can hardly be termed a violation of the antitrust laws. In fact, there is
only a rather tenuous relationship between such claims and antitrust
laws, which is shown by the doctrine of secondary meaning; that
doctrine precludes competitors of the trademark owner from using
words which because of their descriptiveness or other deficiencies are
not initially susceptible of exclusive appropriation by anyone. The
mark is, in nature, not a monoply; it is protected as a property right,
the use of which has a limited scope (catch-word use of the mark)
for a limited purpose (to identify and advertise a particular article).
Because of a noticeable judicial monopolophobia 2 and the recent
attempts of the Department of Justice to make the nation monopolyconscious with respect to trademarks, it is salutary that the Lanham
Act supports the theory that a trademark is an independent property
right.13
This is not to deny that d trademark may be employed for the purpose of implementing and strengthening a pattern of restraint of
10. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 224 Fed. 566,
572 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 227 Fed. 46 (2d Cir. 1915); Hoffman v. Riverside & Dan
River Cotton Mills, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
11. Independent Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman, 130 Fed. 726, 728
(C.C.D.N.J. 1904).
12. Cf. Callmann, The "Sunkist" Decision: Trade-Marks at the Crossroads,
38 TRADE MARK REP. 304; contra: Pattishall, Trade-Marks and the Monopoly
Phobia, 50 MICn. L. REV. 967 (1952) (rejecting the property concept as applicable to trademarks). See also Oppenheim, The Public Interest in Legal
Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property, 40 TRADE MARK REP. 613
(1950) defending the exclusive rights against the effort of the "restrictionists"
to overemphasize the public interest at the expense of the private claimant.
He properly wonders whether there has been created "a judicial psychology
which will swing the pendulum too far in the direction of cutting down the
legal safeguards against imitation or misappropriation of the good will
embodied in the commercial magentism of trade symbols." Id. at 630.
13. 3 CALLMANN, § 66.3.
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trade. Thus the use of trade and certification marks by trade associations and cartels (collusion of licensing and concurrent use), e.g.,
of few dominant concerns, in the domestic and international trade,
may serve to divide markets between members and to exclude outsiders and deprive smaller independent competitors of the chance to
compete; and a mark may be used to control the channels of trade,
e.g., where manufacturers divide the world into exclusive marketing
areas,14 or where jobbers and retailers are licensed to deal in branded
goods;' 5 where several manufacturers of different kinds of goods
prevent each other from expanding into the fields of others; 16 the use
of marks as a device for tying restrictions by which the boundaries
of a patent monopoly are expanded in violation of section 3 of the
Clayton Act. 17 In these cases the abuse of the mark is normally incidental to an underlying agreement in violation of the antitrust laws.
However, it cannot be denied that in such cases the mark is a means
of implementing the restraint of trade. Thus, if competitors use the
same mark in different markets, and agree to stay out of the other's
market, the registration of the mark in favor of each competitor leads
to an exclusion of all others in perpetuity. Even where the mark is
not stamped into the product it is almost impossible to give up a
well-known, internationally advertised trademark and to introduce
a new one with all the expenses for advertising, packaging and distribution. Furthermore, the mark extends the force of such an agreement beyond the parties, to all their distributors, dealers, exporters. 18
Discriminatory pricing under different marks is often used as a
means of deceiving the public concerning the quality of goods; if a
manufacturer favors one customer over others, a violation of the
Robinson-Patman amendment to section 2 of the Clayton Act also
14. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, (1951),
modifying and affirming, 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949). The Supreme
Court found the appellant guilty of numerous antitrust violations and of
participation in an international cartel but it did not outlaw the mark. Compare this result with the unreported case of United States v. S.K.F. Industries,
Inc., Civ. No. 9862, E.D. Pa., 1950, where the Swedish parent and its American
subsidiary used the mark "S.K.F." for territorial divisions and other agreements in restraint of trade. In addition to enjoining the defendants from those
practices, the American subsidiary was required to adopt a different trademark.
15. See United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944);
United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
16. See Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 7 F.2d 967 (3d Cir.

1925), affirming, 299 Fed. 834 (1924), cert. granted, 269 U.S. 551 (1926), aff'd,
273 U.S. 629 (1927).
17. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952).

18. Most antitrust suits instituted by the Department of Justice in this field
have terminated in consent decrees. See United States v. American Bosch Corp.,
Civ. No. 20-164, S.D.N.Y., 1948; United States v Rohm & Haas Co., Civ. No.
9068, E.D.Pa., 1948; United States v. Electric Storage Battery Co., Civ. No.
31-225 S.D.N.Y., 1947; United States v. General Electric Co., Civ. Nos. 1364, 2590,
D.N.J., 1946; United States v. Merck & Co., Civ. No. 3159, D.N.J., 1945.
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may be indicated; 9 it may also be used as a weapon in a price war
declared by a combine against small independent manufacturers by
means of so-called "fighting brands," which are brands offered at
prices lower and on terms more favorable than those asked by the
seller for substantially the same article under a different brand or
20
name.
It is not the purpose of this article to comment on the use of trademarks in aid of antitrust violations. Excellent discussions of this
problem are available. 21 We turn to the peculiar problems posed by
trademarks that have become most potent economic forces, i.e., the
22
worldmarks. A trademark, as this writer recently pointed out,
blossoms into a worldmark when the article it identifies has been
sold in so many countries and so successfully that the mark has become
known in a considerable part of the world not only to those who buy
the article but even to those who might never become buyers, the socalled general public. Such a mark enjoys world-wide status because
it has been accepted, by the public at large, as the mark of a certain
business.
THE WORLDMARK

AD ITS GooDwILL

It is this writer's first premise that the situs of a worldmark's goodwill is the situs of the international business that produces the
article, unless that business uses different national trademarks in
the various countries where the article is made and/or sold. The public will, by and large, identify Ford and Coca-Cola with the United
States, Coty, Chanel and Cointreau with France, Guiness and Jaguar
19. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1952). See Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. FTC, 101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1939) (Goodyear sold the same tires
to one customer under the marks "All State" and "Companion" at a lesser
price than it sold to others under the marks "All Weather" and "Pathfinder").
20. United States v. American Thread Co., Civ. No. 312, D.N.J.Eq., 1914 (consent decree).
21. See Borchardt, Are Trade-Marks an Anti-Trust Problem? 31 GEo. L.J.
245 (1943); Diggins, Trade-Marks in Restraint of Trade 32 GEo. L.J. 113 (1944);
Zlinkoff, Monopoly Versus Competition: Significant Trends in Patent, AntiTrust, Trade-Mark and Unfair Competition Suits 53 YALE L.J. 514 (1944);
Berge, Anti-Trust Enforcement in the War and Postwar Period 12 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 371, 390 (1944); Taggart, Trade-Marks: Monopoly or Competition?
40 TRADE-MARK BuLL. 25 (1945). See also Judge Frank's concurring opinion
in Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1945); Handler, TradeMarks and Anti-Trust Laws, 38 TRADE-MARK REP. 387 (1948); Bergson, Current
Problems in the Enforcement of the Anti-trust Law, 39 TRADE-MARK REP. 187,
194 (1949); Timberg, Trade-Marks, Monopoly and the Restraint of Competition, 14 Law and Cont. Prob. 323 (1949); Stedman, Elimination of Trade Barriers Based upon Trade-Marks 10 FED. B.J. 162 (1949); Stedman, Patent and
Trade-Mark Relief in Antitrust Judgments, 10 FED. B.J. 260 (1949); Derenberg,
The Impact of the Antitrust Laws on Trademarks in Foreign Commerce, 42
TRADE-MARK REP. 365 (1952). See the excellent Note, The Monopoly Concept
of Trade-Marks and Trade Names and "Free Ride" Theory of Unfair Competition, 17 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 112 (1948).
22. Callmann, Thoughts on the Protection of Worldmarks, 44 TRADE-MARK
REP. 1134 (1954).
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with England, Fiat and Olivetti with Italy, 4711, Zeiss and Bayer with
Germany, and Omega with Switzerland. In all these cases the situs
of the goodwill of those marks is the situs of the main business in
the United States, France, England, Italy, Germany and Switzerland,
respectively. In the case of Unilever, however, its margarine is identified as "White Lune" in England, "Blauband" in Germany, "Start"
in Holland, "Solo" in Belgium, "Astra" in France, and "Sava" in
Turkey; the situs of the goodwill of each such mark would be in the
country where the particular mark is used.
That a trademark has only one goodwill is basic to the nature
of both the trademark and the goodwill concept. Goodwill cannot
be divorced from the source that supplies the market any more than
the reputation of a person can be separated from the person. It is
therefore an integral part of the business in the case of a business
mark like "Ford" and of the article in the case of a merchandise mark
like "Lincoln." The courts have always insisted that the situs of the
goodwill of a trade marked article is the same as the situs of the business that produces the article.3
The importance of this analysis became especially manifest when,
after the two world wars, the repercussions of the Alien Property
23. See Ingenohl v. Walter E. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S. 541 (1927); Baglin v.

Cusenier Co., 221 U.S. 580 (1911); Soci6t6 Vinicole de Champagne v. Mumm
Champagne and Importation Co., 10 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
In the Mumm case, the French Sequester of enemy property had seized
the Stammhaus in Reims (France), which was owned by German nationals,
as well as the marks registered in the United States and other countries. The
issue was whether the French sequestration of the Mumm business in France
was confined to the corporeal and incorporeal property within the French
territory, with the result that the sale of the business by the French Liquidator
did not affect the trademarks registered in the United States. For its major
premise the court properly assumed that the French Liquidator could not sell
what the Sequester had not in fact confiscated and that the Sequester could
not confiscate what was not located in French territory; it then pointed out
that American trademarks originate from use, not registration, that the trademarks in question were symbolic of the goodwill of the main French business
and not of the American establishment or branch, and that this goodwill had
its situs in Reims, France. For that reason the court held that the Sequester
had lawfully confiscated the trademarks registered in the United States and
therefore that the Liquidator was entitled to sell them.
In its opinion, the Court distinguished the Baglin and Ingenohl cases. The
Baglin case involved the famous 'Chartreuse" recipe which went with the
Cartusian monks when they fled from France to Spain. The secret recipe was
the essence of the monks' business, and the goodwill of their product rested
upon the recipe. Therefore the situs of the goodwill was transferred to Spain
together with the recipe. Since the French Sequester could not confiscate the
secret formula because it was no longer in France, he had only confiscated
immaterial corporeal things and not the business itself.
The Ingenohl case involved an owner of a cigar factory in Manila who had
established a similar factory in Hongkong, using the same trademark for
cigars produced there. The United States Supreme Court held that since there
were two independent enterprises, the confiscation of the Manila business by
the Alien Property Custodian did not affect the business in Hongkong.
In distinguishing the case, the district court noted: "If Ingenohl's business had been a unitary business, such as we have in the instant case in respect of G. H. Mumm & Co., the decision of the Supreme Court may well
have been different." 10 F. Supp. at 296.
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Custodian's vesting activity created legal headaches for both the
buyers and the former owners of the vested trademarks. When
the Alien Property Custodian, in defiance of fundamental trademark
principles, confiscated and then sold parts of a foreign business of
world-wide fame together with "its" mark-merely because those parts
were within his jurisdiction, (sometimes only offices, demonstration or
show rooms, store rooms)-he confiscated and sold a goodwill that
did not exist. The real goodwill of the mark was not in fact within
his jurisdiction. Here the buyers of such worldmarks are faced with
a dilemma, and we will see later how their position can conflict with
the antitrust laws.
When the Alien Property Custodian sells a vested mark, does it sell
a "naked" mark or a mark that is connected with a goodwill? This is
the critical question and it is directly related to the problem of the
situs of the mark's goodwill. American courts have wrestled with this
question, especially where domestic agents, distributors or importers
of foreign manufacturers, relying solely upon their formal rights in
a trademark registration, seek to exclude the foreign trademark
owner from the American market when, because of the war, the
foreign manufacturer was prevented from shipping his goods to the
Western Hemisphere. The courts accepted the premise that an importer may obtain a "valuable reputation for himself and his ware
by his care in selection of his precautions as to transit and storage,
or because his local character is such as that the article acquires a
value by his testimony to its genuineness. '"24 On the other hand, it
should be noted that when a licensee merely sells goods under the
trademark of a foreign manufacturer, he is introducing the goods
25
into the domestic market for the benefit of the foreign licensor.
Although an exclusive sales agent for a foreign manufacturer may
have the formal right to apply for a trademark registration in his
own name, he can do so only to protect his exclusive sales rights as a
kind of, "special owner," and the foreign manufacturer remains the
real owner of the trademark. 26
The Patent Office was confronted with the problem when distributors of foreign trademarked goods claimed ownership of the foreign
mark and either applied for registration of the foreign mark, or
entered oppositions to its registration by the foreign trademark owner
or to the registration of an allegedly confusingly similar mark. Assistant Commissioner Daphne Leeds adopted the indivisible or unitary
theory of goodwill and in a line of cases, which this writer believed to
24. Imperial Tobacco Co. of India v. Bonnan, 41 R.P.C. 441 (1924).
25. Midy v. idy Laboratories, Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q. 429 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948).
26. Soci6t6 Enfants Gombault v. Lawrence-Williams Co., 16 TRADE MAIC
REP. 467 (N.D. Ohio 1926).
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be sound, denied the trademark ownership to the distributor. 27 In
the second Leitz case, for example, Mrs. Leeds remarked:
It is true that as a result of the sale of German Leitz products in the
United States by its American distributor, New York Leitz, a considerable amount of trademark goodwill was generated in the United States,
but such goodwill was not separated, indeed, it was inseparable, from
the mark itself. In other words, the goodwill in the United States which
was symbolized by the trademark 'Leitz' had its situs in Wetzlar, Germany,

where the manufacturer was located. The American distributor acquired
no rights in the trademark or in the goodwill symbolized by it merely as
a result of importation and sale in this country of the products of
Germany Leitz.27a

In two decisions, one by the District Court of the District of Columbia,28 the other by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 29
the courts rejected Mrs. Leeds' analysis. The District Court of the
District of Columbia held that the local Leitz firm was independent
of the German Leitz Company, that the factual situation was even
more convincing than it was in the Bourjois case 30 because the American Leitz firm did not confine itself to the importation of German
Leitz products but sold items purchased from others and even itself
engaged in the manufacture in the United States of products bearing
the Leitz trademark. Finally the court concluded: ". . . if the public
ever understood or now understands all products bearing the 'Leitz'
mark as having originated with German Leitz, its understanding was
and is erroneous."3 1 (Emphasis added.)
In the writer's opinion, the fact that American Leitz was engaged in
manufacture and bought goods from other sources should not have
been controlling. Whatever it had done in the past, it was generally
accepted that American Leitz was only the former branch of the
German firm, capitalizing on the strength of the German firm's patents
and know-how. Irrespective of its present activities, its appearance
still remains, and whether or not there is still a link with its German
ancestry is a matter of internal interest only. (In most cases of this
kind, the relationships between the German parents and their American branches were subsequently reinstated). This, however, is of
minor importance. The more critical test is what the public believes
when "Leitz" is used in connection with optical instruments. In
concluding that the understanding of the public was erroneous if it
27. See Callmann, Thoughts on the Protection of Worldmarks, 44
MARK REP.

TRADE

1134 (1954).

27a. 105 U.S.P.Q. at 483.
28. E. Leitz, Inc. v. Watson, 152 F. Supp. 631 (D.D.C. 1957)
under 35 U.S.C. 146 (1952)).

29 Roger & Gallet v. Janmarie, Inc., 245 F.2d 505 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
30. A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).

(proceeding

31. E. Leitz, Inc. v. Watson, 152 F. Supp. 631, 637 (D.D.C. 1957).
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associates the "Leitz" mark with the German Leitz Company, the
court committed its most fundamental error. In this context, it is impossible for the public to be wrong. This would be a contradiction
in terms because it is the understanding and the reaction of the
public that determines whether or not the use of any commercial
designation is misleading.32 This is self-evident when we recall the
rule that even an abandoned mark may not be appropriated by another if the public still identifies the mark with the original user, because, as the courts say, such an appropriation "will, in all likelihood, deceive the public."33
In Roger & Galet v. Janmarie, Inc.34 the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, modifying the Commissioner's decisions, said through
Judge Rich:
We think it is a mistake to assume that all of the goodwill symbolized
by a trademark in international use has its situs at the place where the
goods bearing the mark are made, at least to the extent of being so immobilized there as to preclude its original owner from parting with
segments of it on a national basis. We are concerned here with business
and goodwill attached to United States trademarks, not French trademark rights existing under French law. We take it as axiomatic that
neither the trademark law of France nor of the United States has any
extraterritorial effect. Where, then, can business done under United
States trademarks, registered in the United States Patent Office, and the
goodwill symbolized by them have their situs except in the territory
where United States law is enforceable? The location of the owner
of such trademarks, the beneficiary of the goodwill attached to them, is
an entirely different question and in this case the owner, until such time
as he chose to part with his United States rights, was unquestionably
the French manufacturer located in France. But to our minds, what was
being dealt with by the assignment in question was the business done in
the United States under United States trademarks symbolizing goodwill
in the United States. This opposition proceeding was brought to protect
that business and goodwill against confusion in the domestic market. The
legal concept of goodwill which we adopt must be in accord with business realities. We therefore hold that the situs of the goodwill of the
business done under the 'JEAN MARIE FARINA' trademarks in the
United States was in the United States.35
In error, the court distinguished between the goodwill "attached
to United States trademarks" and the goodwill attached to French
32. The court stated that the American Leitz firm was cautioned by the
Head of Trademark Operation that "the use of the mark 'Leitz' on goods other
than those originating with German Leitz would manifestly be deceptive and
a false designation of origin." Id. at 635. (Emphasis added.)
33. See Kaplan v. Marcus, 81 N.Y.S.2d, 432 (1948); Sarasohn v. Andrew
Jergens Co., 45 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1943). See also 3 CALLMANN at 1343, 1354.
34. 245 F.2d 505 (C.C.P.A., Patents, 1957).
35. Id. at 509-10. This writer challenges the holding of this court not only
with respect to the goodwill theory but also with respect to the interpretation
of the concept of assignment (see infra).
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trademarks as if the trademarks of both countries symbolized different businesses. The fact that the French manufacturer was
doing business in the United States under domestic trademarks
gave its local business no economic independence. Moreover, this
could not answer the critical question whether the American public
associated the French firm name of Roger & Gallet with a French
business, especially when the American management, as the Commissioner pointed out several times, uses labels "entirely in the French
language."''
Furthermore there is no logical nexus between the
identification of the situs of a trademark's goodwill and the truism that
United States law is enforceable in the United States. Situs can still
be abroad, although certain claims may be enforceable in the
United States.
The dimension of the court's error is highlighted by comparing
its decision with the Guerlain-Corday-Lanvin7 decision of the District
Court of the Southern District of New York, issued four weeks later.
There Judge Edelstein held that the defendants had resorted to section
526 of the Tariff Act of 19303 in order to exclude competitive importation of trademarked goods in violation of the antitrust laws. Here
we are not so much concerned with the antitrust law aspect of the
case39 as we are with Judge Edelstein's excellent analysis of the economic structure of, and his trenchant observations on the significance
of the trademark in, the prefume trade. In these cases, the French
and the domestic businesses were legally independent corporations;
both had registered the same trademarks in the Patent Office, and
the entire thrust of the advertising emphasized-as in the Roger &
Gallet case--"the prestige factor of origin with Parisian perfumers."
The French companies had given their associated American companies the exclusive right to distribute their products locally and
transferred to them trademark rights "intended to be sufficient to
justify registration in the United States Patent Office on the basis
of a claim of ownership by the American company."4° (Emphasis
added.) As this is standard with perfume traders in the United
States, the court held that "it can hardly be claimed by the defendants
in the cases at bar that the trademarks indicate an origin with them
in the United States, inasmuch as the whole burden of their advertising is to emphasize French origin." Judge Edelstein rejected defendant's claim of economic independence and, finding that "the
'corporate veil' is easily pierced by the merest glance through the
36. Opposition of Roger & Gallet, 109 U.S.P.Q. 16, 17 (1956).

37. Three separate actions by United States v. Guerlain, Inc., Parfums Corday, Inc., Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (consolidated

for trial).

38. 46 STAT. 741 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1952).
39. Upon this aspect, see infra 534.
40. United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F.Supp. 77, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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forms of the business organizations to the realities of the relationships," concluded, as a matter of fact, that in each case the local company and its French counterpart "constitute a single international
enterprise."41 (Emphasis added.)
On the findings of fact in the Roger & Gallet case, as related in the
opinions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Assistant Commissioner, there is sufficient basis for the same conclusion
that the French and American companies constituted a single international enterprise.
With the hindsight of Judge Edelstein's analysis, the court's opinion
in the Roger & Gallet case was clearly in error in splitting the goodwill of the French-American single enterprise into separate French and
American fragments.42
Only in passing need we point out that Judge Rich also erred in
holding that the transfer of trademark rights from the French to the
American company was a valid assignment. In this respect Mrs. Leeds
was right: the parties to the recorded instrument which purported to
be an assignment "continued to do that, and only that, which they
were doing prior to and at the time the instrument was executed,"
there was no "transfer of either the goodwill of the business in which
the mark is used or that part of the business connected with the use of
and symbolized by the mark. The mark continues to be used in the
French concern's business and to symbolize the goodwill of that concern. '43 The "assignment" could at best be called a "license" between
"related companies." 44 But if, in fact, the two companies are a single
international enterprise, then we do not even need the device of a
license; if both companies are one, each would be entitled to use the
marks of the other as its own without formal licensing. Whenever
the Patent Office has doubts with respect to the corporate structure
and the relationship of the companies, it could request the registrant
to obtain the written consent of the other party concerned.
41. Id. at 80, 89.

42. It could be argued that the Roger & Gallet case should be distinguished
from the other cases discussed here because the trademark involved was not
the house mark "Roger & Gallet" but the merchandise mark "Jean Marie
Farina." This, however, was not a significant difference because the latter
mark had a fame of its own and, in addition, never appeared in any advertisement without some reference to "Roger & Gallet" and to the perfume's
French origin in French language.
43. Opposition of Roger & Gallet, 109 U.S.P.Q. 16, 19 (1956).

44. Lanham Act § 5. See Browne-Vintners Co., v. National Distillers &
Chemical Corp., 151 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) where the court held that
both the French trademark owner and the American licensee were entitled
to use and register the same trademarks in the United States "without
affecting their validity or the validity of the registrationsprovided the public
is not deceived thereby." (Emphasis added.) Reference was made to 4
CALLMANN

at 2119-20.
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EXCLUSION OF A COMPETITOR FROM THE MARKET

Exclusion of the Worldmark Owner
Immediately after both World Wars many of the most famous
foreign trademarks (and especially those of such famous German
concerns as 4711, Faber-Castell, Bayer, Leitz, Zeiss) which had been
vested by the Alien Property Custodian, 45 were sold to the highest
American bidder. As an economic consequence, the formerly undivided market was partitioned, one worldmark was divided into two,
and the American traddmark buyer then sought to exclude the owner
of the identical foreign worldmark from the American market. As
indicated above, this was a legal as well as an economic travesty.
It was once assumed that the law with respect to vested marks was
sui generis. Thus, for example, it was held 46 that the transfer of a
vested trademark by itself and without a business was justified because
its seizure by the Alien Property Custodian was a war act and as
such "superseded certain phases of the ordinary law of trademarks
and substituted the sovereign in their place." In line with this theory,
under the Trading with the Enemy Act,47 the title of the purchaser
from the custodian was declared to be unassailable, 48 although this
presented some rather thorny difficult problems of international law.49
On the other hand it has been said that the activities of the Alien
Property Custodian are-not sacrosanct. Transactions of the custodian
45. Trading with the Enemy Act §§ 7, 12, 40 STAT. 416, 423 (1917), as
amended 50 U.S.C. App. § 7, 12 (1952). See Aktien Gesellschaft far Feinmechanik, Vormals Jetter & Scheerer v. Kny-Scheerer Corp., 75 F.2d 638, 639,
(C.C.P.A. 1935).
See amendment to the First War Powers Act, amending section 32 of the
Trading with the Enemy Act, Public Law 671, 60 STAT. 930 (1946), as amended,
50 U.S.C. App. § 32(c) (1952), authorizing the Alien Property Custodian to
return vested property to innocent victims of Axis aggression who may havebeen nationals or residents of enemy countries.
46. Hicks v. Anchor Packing Co., 16 F.2d 723 (3rd Cir. 1926).
47. 40 STAT. 416 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 7 (1952).
48. Under Allied High Commission Law No. 63 of August 31, 1951; Article
3 (Official Gazette of the Allied High Commission No. 64 of Sept. 5, 1951, p.
1107; German Bundesanzeiger No. 176 of Sept. 12, 1951, p. 2; Mitteilungen der
Bank deutscher Lander No. 6062 of Sept. 15, 1951), "no claim or action based
on or arising out of the transfer, liquidation or delivery of property to which
this Law extends shall be admissible: (a) against any person who has transferred or acquired title or possession of such property, or against such property,
(b) against any international agency, any government of a foreign country,
or any person acting in conformity with the instructions of such agency or
government."
49. The extraterritorial effect of the confiscation of trademarks in the
United States and in other victor nations has been referred to the courts of
several countries. Thus, the Swiss, West German and Austrian courts have
held that they could not recognize legal measure of foreign governments
which were contradictory to fundamental principles of their own law. Thus,
the uncompensated expropriation of German firms by Soviet Russia or its
satellites did not entitle East German firms to use those trademarks in competition with West German firms which legally succeeded to firms previously
located in Eastern Germany. See Abel, Confiscation and Trade Marks, 44
TRADE-MARK REP. 1279 (1954).
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with respect to foreign trademarks are subject to the same rules of
law applicable to voluntary transactions of trademark owners. The
sale of a trademark is to be treated on the same basis "as if it were
a voluntary conveyance of its interests in the United States by the
[foreign] . . .corporation. It is not the case of a sale in invitum of
the goodwill and business. 5 0° In this respect the Alien Property
Custodian enjoys no special status and is to be treated as a private individual. 51 The Alien Property Custodian can not do what the trademark owner could not do himself. If therefore he transfers a mark
without the goodwill or any part of the goodwill of the business with
which it is connected, 52 the transferee will obtain the rights of the
former alien owner subject to all existing limitations of law.5 3 Thus,
for example, nonexclusive licenses to a trademark, granted by the
Chemical Foundation, as trustee for the American industry of patents
assigned to it by the Alien Property Custodian, were held void.5 4 And
the sale of the vested German trademark "Bosch" to a New York
corporation was held to be so limited, that neither the original owner
nor the purchaser from the Alien Property Custodian obtained the
exclusive right to the "Bosch" name. 55
Now to the peculiar dilemma facing the purchasers of vested worldmarks and the antitrust law implications. In almost all such cases, on
the strength of his newly acquired mark, the purchaser sought to bar
the owner of the identical foreign mark from entry into the United
States market. Does the unassailability of the sale of the mark
by the Alien Property Custodian mean that the purchaser has the
same rights as any other trademark owner against another's use of
the same or a confusingly similar mark? Can the purchaser properly
invoke section 526 of the Tariff Act? The answer to both questions,
in the writer's opinion, is no.
Those who contracted with the Alien Property Custodian did not
know the legal problems better than the Alien Property Custodian
and the situation was a peculiar one. The fact that they accepted the
acts of the Alien Property Custodian, such as vesting and sale, did
not validate them legally. The situation is singularly analogous to
that which results when a trademark owner abandons a well-known
mark and some one else then adopts it as his own. This, of course,
inevitably leads to a deception of the public unless the new user
50. Koppel Industrial Car & Equipment Co. v. Orenstein & Koppel, 289 Fed.
446, 451 (2d Cir. 1923). See Mulhens & Kropff, Inc. v. Ferd. Muelhens, Inc.,
43 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1930).

51. F.A.R. Liquidating Corp. v. McGranery, 96 U.S.P.Q. 302 (D.Del. 1953).
52. Lanham Act § 10.
53. Hunyadi Janos Corp. v. Stoeger, 5 F.2d 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1925).
54. Seeck & Kade, Inc. v. Pertussin Chemical Co., 235 App. Div. 251, 256
N.Y. Supp. 567 (1st Dep't 1932).
55. American Bosch Magneto Corp. v. Robert Bosch Magneto Co., 127 Misc.
119, 215 N.Y. Supp. 387 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
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takes positive steps to inform the public that his business is in nowise connected with the business that formerly owned the mark. But
even those efforts will not suffice, when the goodwill of the former
trademark owner is very strong; then the original goodwill survives
the act of abandonment and overshadows all efforts of the new owner.
The trademark owner's good intentions, however manifest, and all of
his efforts, however sincere, cannot supersede legal principles dictated
by the inherent nature of the trademark.
The strength of a mark and public reaction to it must not be
ignored, and, the acts of the parties or government officials can
neither vitiate economic facts nor command them to be inapplicable.
This was demonstrated in a case where the plaintiff consolidated two
newspapers, the "Sun" and "Journal" and continued only the latter.
When the defendant published a newspaper, calling it the "Sun," he
was enjoined on the improper ground that the original owner of
the "Sun" had not intended to abandon that name.56 As more properly
suggested, 57 the associative significance, which survived the nonuse,
justified the decision. A line of later cases properly holds that no
one is entitled to appropriate an abandoned mark while the public
memory of the former business is still viable. 58
In myriad variations, our courts have emphasized the significance
of the old goodwill; the naked transfer of a trademark in gross is
basically at variance with the fundamental premise of American
trademark law. The essence of the trademark is its function as a
symbol and if there is nothing to be symbolized there cannot be a
trademark.
Nevertheless legal principles have to bow to forced political actualities and to the axiom that the purchaser of a worldmark from the
Alien Property Custodian has an unassailable position with respect
to the ligitimate source of his ownership, no matter what this ownership may be worth in the practical life of world competition.
To illustrate the resulting dilemma when the Alien Property Custodian pays no heed to the economic intricacies of a worldmark, the
Bosch case 59 is a good example. In 1906, Robert Bosch, the founder of
56. Powell v. Valentine, 106 Kan. 645, 189 Pac. 163 (1920).
57. See Note, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 695 (1930).
58. See, e.g., Corr v. Oldetyme Distillers, Inc., 28 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1057,
118 F.2d 919, 923 (1941); Lawyers Title Ins. Co. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp.,
109 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Sherwood Co. v. Sherwood Distilling Co., 177
Md. 455, 9 A.2d 842 (1939); Interstate Distilleries v. Sherwood Distilling &
Distributing Co., 173 Md. 173, 195 Atl. 387 (1937); Note, 22 MINN. L. REv. 750
(1938).

59. American Bosch Magneto Corp. v. Robert Bosch Magneto Co., 127

Misc. 119, 215 N.Y. Supp. 387, (Sup. Ct. 1926). Compare Browne-Vintners Co.,

Inc. v. National Distillers & Chemical Corp., 151 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
The German Mumm family owned a business which sold German wine under
a trade name including the name "Mumm." Later the family established a
champagne business in France using a different mark containing the name
"Mumm." After World War I the French government seized the French busi-
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a German enterprise, established "Robert Bosch New York Inc." which
-was later changed to "Bosch Magneto Corp." This firm was vested
by the Alien Property Custodian after the First World War and in
1918 it was sold to a Mr. Kern. In 1919, the newly formed American
Bosch Magneto Corporation acquired from Kern all the American
assets of the former German firm and continued its business. In 1921
the German Bosch firm founded Robert Bosch Magneto Co. in New
York and used the "Bosch" name in connection with the sale of
articles similar to those made by the American Bosch Magneto Company. When the latter sought an injunction, the former claimed the
exclusive right to the Bosch name. The court noted that, after the
vesting and sale of the American patent rights, Robert Bosch continued his German business and that he would have been free to do
the same in the United States if he respected the sale of the American
firm's goodwill and patents to the American corporation. The court
assumed that the sale by the Alien Property Custodian was valid
and thus immune from attack by the German firm or its American
branch. On the other hand, the court held that neither the American
nor the German Bosch firm had a monopoly in the Bosch name, and
therefore that the only real question in litigation was whether the
two firm names were confusingly similar. This the court denied. Although there are dissimilarities in the two uses, the similarities are
more evident. Indeed, the dissimilarities are minimal because the
famous catchword "Bosch" overshadows all of the descriptive or
geographical accessories. There was definitely a likelihood of confusion.
Not infrequently a court will hide behind the familiar concept
of confusion because it shrinks from a more realistic approach to
the basic problem. 6° The real reason for admitting the German firm
to the American market was not the unlikelihood of confusion but
the economic and legal travesty which would have resulted from a
prohibitive decree of the court.
The relationship between the domestic purchaser and the foreign
owner of the worldmark is so unusual that we should not limit ourselves to the simple question whether the trademarks or the firm
names are confusingly similar. To a certain degree they always
have been and still are confusingly similar. We must probe the
ness and sold it to the plaintiff who adopted the present name "G.H. Mumm &
Co. Soci6t6 Vinicole de Champagne, Successeurs" and appointed an exclusive
distributor in the United States. The German firm entered the American
market under the name "G.H. v. Mumm" (allegedly based upon the name
of the present owner of the German firm "Godefroy Hermann von Mumm")
and plaintiff sought an injunction against any use of "Mumm." The court,
however, denied this broad request and held that the owner of the German
firm could use his full name, together with an equally clear legend disavowing
any connection with the French business.
60. For instance, in the infamous case of dilution, see 4 CALLMANN § 84.2.
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undercurrents of a complicated economic phenomenon and accept
the premise that in all such cases, the purchaser from the Alien
Property Custodian of the American sector of a worldmark is fully
aware of the fact that the former foreign owner is still active in the
marketing of the same articles throughout the world; that it is
inevitable that such a situation will lead to complications and that
the worldmark in the hands of the American purchaser may prove
to be a Trojan horse. The purchaser may not have realized that because of the nature of any world-famous trademark, as a symbol of
goodwill, it is as indivisible as the goodwill it symbolizes; both
trademarks, the one in the hands of the new purchaser and the other
in the hands of the foreign owner, represent an economic unit and
the worldmark can not be severed and used alone as if it were an
ordinary trademark. 61 The real question, therefore, is not whether the
use of the foreign owner's trademark or firm name would infringe the
new purchaser's trademark or firm name, but whether the purchaser of
the American sector of the worldmark also bought the right to
ban the foreign owner of the worldmark from the American market
forever. This, in fact, is what the purchaser in all these cases seeks to
achieve.
The problem becomes more obvious if we approach it from the
angle of the foreign owner of a firm name (and most worldmarks -are
simultaneously firm names). The trademark is the symbol of an
article, and the firm or tradename symbolizes a business. If the
seller of an article is enjoined from the use of his trademark, he
must either select a different trademark or abandon his attempt to
market the article. Although this can prejudice the success of his
efforts, under certain circumstances this is a risk he must assume.
If, on the other hand, a business is enjoined from using its firm name
in a certain market, it will be barred from that market. The use of
a trademark is, more or less, an act of deliberate decision. This is not
so with respect to a firm name. The use of a firm name is not dictated
by competitive conditions alone. The function of individualization, or
identification of a personality, must be met. Indeed, from the standpoint of policing market conditions, the use of one's firm name is in
the public interest. Thus, certain laws prohibit the sale of goods
62
unless the producer's firm name is clearly printed on the label.
Furthermore, the element of personality is especially significant with
respect to reputation and credit. A firm cannot be lightly deprived
of the right to use its firm name in offering and selling its goods.
Our courts, which are in other respects far behind the European courts
61. See Callmann, Thoughts on the Protection of Worldmarks, 44
MARK REP.

TRADE-

1134 (1954).

62. See, for instance, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 52
1047, 1050, 1054 (1938), 21 U.S.C. §§ 343(c), 352(b), 362(b) (1952).

STAT.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL.. 11

in protecting the right of personality, jealously guard the right of
an individual to use his own name in business, characterizing it as
an inalienable or sacred right.63 The question here at issue transcends
the law of trademarks and firm names. It opens a restraint of trade
issue, the implications of which must be considered under the antitrust laws.
And there is yet another facet involved, that of economic policy. When
the custodian vested the American sector of the worldmark, there was
a military purpose to be served. German property was thus dedicated to the American economy, and in this manner, albeit indirectly,
it became more difficult, if not impossible, for the German economy to
enter the American market. Can the purchaser's present attempt
to keep the foreign worldmark owner out of the American marketunder normal circumstances a violation of the antitrust laws-be
justified in times of peace under the war policy of the United States?
To state it differently, did the administrative act of the Alien Property
Custodian, in vesting and selling the former business, forever exempt
the American buyer from the restraints and prohibitions of the antitrust laws, vis-a-vis its relationships with the former foreign owner.
If so, the purchaser would have the right to bar the foreign worldmark owner from the American market in futuro. True, the Alien
Property Custodian was empowered to damage the German economy,
to deprive it of its assets in the United States, and to keep it out of
the United States market.64 But times have changed, and the comparison between the first policy statement by the Alien Property
Custodian and the State Department's present position speaks for
itself. Surely, the Department of Justice would not accept the argument that the Alien Property Custodian can grant immunity under
the antitrust laws.
The exclusion of a competitor from the market territory of another
may take different forms. Thus it may be achieved by contracts of
exclusion between two competitors, by interference with another's
business relations, e.g., a secondary boycott, or by the unlawful exploitation of an absolute right, e.g., a patent or a trademark. Contracts
of exclusion, i.e., agreements among competitors with the purpose of
market division, are like price fixing agreements illegal per se because they have the purpose and the necessary effect of eliminating
competition. 65 Secondary boycotts are also illegal per se. 66 The use
63. See the cases cited in 4 CALLMANN § 85.2(a). Recently, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized the right of publicity as a special
right of the business personality. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
64. See Annual Report of the Alien Property Custodian 144 (1944); id. 133
(1945).

65. Cf. Tinken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, (1951);
United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947), affirming 63 F. Supp.
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67
of a patent right is only legal when the patent is not misused.
The misuse of a trademark by competitors who by way of agreement
divide the world into exclusive marketing areas has often been discussed.6 8 Now, however, we are met with a different type of trademark misuse. Where a trademark is used in aid of or to fortify a
cartel agreement, its misuse is a kind of supplementary illegality.
Where, however, the mark is the primary device of such an exclusionary purpose, the misuse lies somewhere else; its illegality stems not
from the surrounding circumstances, e.g., a cartel agreement, but from
the claim of an exclusivity that does in fact not exist.
Although exclusivity is essential to the concept of the trademark,
exceptional economic facts may impose upon the trademark owner a
restraint which was seldom voluntarily accepted (except by one whose
ambition did not transgress the modest scope of a limited locality),
and was always necessary for a reasonable compromise of economic
interests. In such situations the Hanover69 and Rectanus7° doctrines
protected the bona fide user- of another's trademark prior to the
enactment of the Lanham Act when the federal registration of a
mark was not yet constructive notice of the registrant's claim of ownership of the mark.71 It was not infrequent to find that a defendant
had established his business in good faith, in complete ignorance
of the plaintiff and his trademark and without intending or reasonably
anticipating confusion; the plaintiff was in the market for a considerable period, without knowing that elsewhere a possible competitor
was developing a goodwill on trademarks similar to his. The small
local business embarked upon an intensive advertising campaign
and expanded into new territories; the rivals eventually collided,
either in one of their own territories or in a third market. In such
cases, equity replaces the rule of priority and coexistence limits the
concept of exclusivity.

A similar legal problem was created when an American concern
acquired the American sector of a worldmark from the Alien Property
Custodian. The owner of the worldmark, helplessly victimized by a
war situation, is deprived of this sector. The purchaser of the mark,
513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86
F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); United States v. General Dyestuff Corp., 57
F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Johnson v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 33
F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Tenn. 1940); afd,

123 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1941).

66. See 2 CALLMANN § 38.
67. Id., §§ 15.6, 16.4.
68. See page 517 supra.
69. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916), affirming sub.
nom. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Allen & Wheeler Co., 208 Fed. 513 (7th Cir.
1913), reversing sub. nom. Metcalf v. Hanover Star Milling Co., 204 Fed. 211
(5th Cir. 1913).
70. United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918), affirming 226 Fed.
545 (6th Cir. 1915), reversing 206 Fed. 570 (W.D. Ky. 1913).
71. See Lanham Act § 22 (a section which is not retroactive).
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who acquired it through the erroneous acts of a government agency,
bought that trademark, but not quite as innocently as the foreign
owner lost it. This author believes,1 2 as recently stated by a district
judge7 3 that the purchaser of the trademark knew or should have
known that the mark he was buying would continue to be used by the
foreign trademark owner in almost all important market territories
in the world; even if he was not conscious of this fact he must be
content with what he bought and must use his newly acquired mark
with all the infirmities attendant upon this situation. He must have
known that he bought a mark with a very limited exclusivity.
Therefore, in both the Bosch and the Mumm cases 4 the courts properly held that neither the American -nor the German Bosch firm, and
neither the French nor the German Mumm firm, had a monopoly
in the famous names and consequently that the purchaser who,
ignoring this limitation, seeks to keep the other out of the American
market is undeniably violating the antitrust laws.
Exclusion by the Worldmark Owner
Although the owner of an ordinary trademark normally sells his
merchandise to wholesalers, retailers or directly to consumers, a
business with a national or even an international market, especially
one with a well known trademark, normally ships to distributors in
different sections of the national market or in different countries.
It may decide upon a uniform treatment of sales throughout the world
or select a special treatment according to the habits and wishes of
the purchasers in different countries. In both instances, however, it
is normally desirable to control the activities of the distributors. Such
a business, therefore, needs an elaborate sales organization, and, of
course, such an organization is not only extremely costly and therefore valuable but also a very vulnerable asset of such a business.
It is only natural to protect this organization and control not only
against its own distributors but also against outsiders who might
disturb it.
It could well be argued that such control should be allowed to a
reasonable degree and that it should have no other limitations than
those absolutely necessary to prevent an unreasonable restraint of
trade. Legal problems, however, mirror the business behavior of our
economic community, and they mushroom with economic change.
72. See note 21 supra. See page 526 supra.
73. Judge McGohey, in Browne-Vintners Co. v. Nat'l Distillers & Chemical
Corp., 151 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See note 56, supra. In this casey
the court remarked that this "must have been apparent to the French Socite
when it purchased the champagne business and the trademarks appurtenant
thereto. Under the circumstances, it could hardly complain if required to
confine its use of the name to champagne." 151 F. Supp. at 606.
74. See pages 526, 519 supra.
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On the revival of international trade after World War II cases arose
in many countries involving the protection of an international sales
organization. The worldmark owner plays a prominent role in these
cases when he seeks to exclude even the seller of his genuine trademarked articles from the territory which he wants to feed through
his own channels. True, this question had arisen in isolated cases in
the past, but today they can be found almost everywhere and have
become symptomatic of a burning problem in international marketing.
The technical device to keep trademarked goods out of the American market is section 42 of the Lanham Act, which is substantially
identical with section 27 of the Trademark Act of 1905, in connection with section 526 of the Tariff Acts of 1922 and 1930J Prior to the
Trademark Act of 1905 the owner of an American trademark, which
he had acquired from a foreign manufacturer, was not able to prevent
the importation of the genuine foreign goods by a third party.7 6
After the enactment of the Trademark Act of 1905 the situation was
the same, for it was directed only against the importation of goods
bearing a mark which copies or simulated a registered trademark.
In Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening (the "Eternelle" case) 7
genuine goods manufactured abroad and identified by a trademark
registered in the United States for the exclusive sales agent of the
foreign manufacturer were imported against the will of the agent.
The district court and the court of appeals held that the trademark
had not been infringed by the importation of the genuine goods28
Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922, consistent with the view of Mr.
Justice Holmes in A. Bourjois v. Katzel,7 9 prohibited the importation
of merchandise which "bears a trade-mark" owned by a domestic
business and registered with the United States Patent Office. The
Tariff Act thus offered the domestic owner of a trademark for foreign75. 46 STAT. 741 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1952).
See also Callmann,
Unfair Competition with Imported Trademarked Goods, 43 VA. L. REV. 323
(1957); Note, 64 YALE L. J. 557 (1955).
76. Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 Fed. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).

77. 238 Fed. 780 (2d Cir. 1916).
78. See Hunyadi Janos Corp. v. Stoeger, 285 Fed. 861 (2d Cir. 1922), following the reversed opinion of A. Bourjoisl& Co. v. Katzel, 275 Fed. 539 (2d Cir.
1921).

79. 260 U.S. 689 (1923), reversing 275 Fed. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), reversing 274
Fed. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1920). "Ownership of the goods does not carry the right
to sell them with a specific mark. It does not necessarily carry the right to
sell them at all in a given place. If the goods were patented in the United
States a dealer who lawfully bought similar goods abroad from one who had
a right to make and sell them there could not sell them in the United
States. .

.

. The monopoly in that case is more extensive, but we see no

sufficient reason for holding that the monopoly of a trade-mark, so far as it
goes, is less complete." 260 U.S. at 692. The Supreme Court's decision is noted
in 23 CoLUm. L. REV. 500 (1923); 36 HARV. L. REv. 629 (1923); 32 YALE L.J. 627
(1923). The opinion of the court of appeals is discussed in 35 HARV. L. REV.
624 (1922).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL,. 11

made goods more complete protection than did section 27 of the
Trademark Act.80 Section 526 offered affirmative protection against
unfair competition while section 27 of the Trademark Act was designed to prohibit trademark infringement as such. The draftsmen
of the Lanham Act did not conform the trademark law with section
526;81 section 42 of the Lanham Act is identical with section 27 of the
Trademark Act of 1905.
A new development of the law seems to be in the offing by reason
of the Guerlain case 82 which introduced a judicial exception to the
rule of section 526. The Guerlain case holds that this provision can
only be invoked for the benefit of an independent American trademark
owner but not by "the American part of a single international enterprise to enable it to prevent the importation into the United States
of authentic products sold abroad by the foreign part of the enterprise."
Guerlain Inc., Parfums Corday, Inc. and Lanvin Parfums, Inc., are
French manufacturers of toilet goods (i.e., perfumes, colognes, toilet
waters, bath preparations and similar goods). They had given their
associated American importer-companies the exclusive right to distribute those goods in the United States, transferring to them sufficient
trademark rights to justify registration in the United States. The
toilet goods were delivered to the American importers in packaged
form ready for sale, or in bulk to be bottled or compounded in the
United States by adding alcohol to the essences or concentrates obtained from the French companies. To prevent the competitive importation of the French trademarked goods by others who had
bought them from the French manufacturers and could and did
sell them in the United States at prices lower than those they charged,
the American companies filed with the Bureau of Customs certificates
of registration of the trademarks identical with those of the French
manufacturers under the terms of section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
section 526 could not be invoked by the American part of a single
international enterprise but only by an independent American trademark owner.
This is completely at odds with the express language of the provision and if it becomes a precedent it will be a judicial amendment
of the law. The reason for this holding lies, of course, outside section
526. The theory is that the use of this technical device is inequitable.
Why? The court recognized "the absence of specific language to that
80. See Perry v. American Hecolite Denture Corp., 78 F.2d 556 (8th Cir.
1935).
81. Although the language of section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 is
inconsistent with the language of section 42 of the Lanham Act, it is not clear
whether section 42 was designed to repeal or supplement section 526.
82. See note 37, supra.
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effect in the legislation" but we may find the clue in the court's
conviction that this attempted application of section 526 would
pervert "the rationale underlying trademark" which "does not support
the exclusion of genuine products by independent American trademark owners any more than it supports exclusion by related importers. '8 3 The court believed that if the defendants were to be granted
such an exclusion this would be a special privilege, which Congress
could not have intended to grant for the benefit of an international
enterprise because that would have to be understood as reading into
the legislation an implied exception to the Sherman Act. The court
then proceeded to a discussion of the charge of illegal monopolization
under section 2 of the Sherman Act. This we will not explore as it
would simplify our problem to confine our study to those cases in
which the trademark owner enjoys a monopolistic position. As
originally stated, we are more interested in those situations where
the use of the mark as such may lead to an unreasonable restraint of
trade.84 Before developing this question further on the basis of the
Guerlain case, let us first examine similar cases in other countries.
In the Netherlands a similar case was presented to the courts.
Plaintiff, the German firm, Grundig-Radio Werke GmbH, in Furth,
Bavaria, owned a mark consisting of the word "Grundig" and the
representation of a threefold cloverleaf. It had been registered in
the Netherlands and used there by plaintiff's exclusive Dutch agent,
Jobo. The defendant, Prins in Amsterdam, sold plaintiff's goods
bearing that trademark, which did not come from Jobo but were
bought by defendant from German wholesalers without plaintiff's
or Jobo's consent. These wholesalers were bound by contract with
83. Emphasis by the court. See Note, 64 YALE L.J. 557, 567 (1955). The
argument that section 526 can only be invoked by an "independent" trademark owner or "by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association created
or organized within, the United States" is no longer accurate. Section 44(b)
of the Lanham Act seeks to implement the commitments of our country under
the international conventions for the protection of industrial property. The
national treatment clauses in article 2 of the Paris Convention and article 1
of the Pan-American Convention were designed to outlaw discrimination
against foreigners or residents of member nations by granting them the same
status as nationals with respect to judicial and administrative protection. In
addition, Article 1OBis of the Paris Convention and Article 20 of the PanAmerican Convention stipulate that all member nations must guarantee the
nationals of other member nations effective protection against unfair competition. These treaties are self-executing, i.e., "equivalent to an act of the
legislature whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative
provision." Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) *253, *314 (1829). Consequently,
they require no special legislative sanction to give them effect. See 4 CALLmMxx at 2203-08. The Lanham Act expressly grants nationals of member
nations equal protection against unfair competition and violation of trademark rights. Indeed, it even so improved the position of foreign applicants
for trademark registration that section 44(i) expressly provides that citizens
or residents of the United States shall have the same benefits as are granted
to foreigners.
84. For that reason, the author does not challenge the court's holding that
there was a monopoly.
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plaintiff to abstain from any export and to sell only to retailers in
plaintiff's German sales organization. The "Rechtsbank" (a kind of
district court) dismissed the complaint, holding that by the sale of
its trademarked article to wholesalers, plaintiff lost the right to control the article through the channels of distribution and, on the
strength of the Trademark law, could not require that the article be
marketed only through its own sales organization. On appeal, the
Gerechtshof te Amsterdam held that defendant by selling plaintiff's
goods in the Netherlands violated plaintiff's Dutch trademark rights.
On review, the Hoge Rad, the highest court, reversed and found that
the Gerechtshof misconceived the trademark law, which was designed only to protect the right in the mark, not to protect plaintiff's
sales organization.85 It remarked that the trademark owner in selling
his trademarked goods could not impose upon the trade provisions
affecting the resale of those goods, (e.g., the provision of exclusive
sale in a certain territory at certain prices) and then prosecute the
defiance of those provisions as a violation of his trademark rights.
"True, the failure to adhere to contractual sales provisions can be
considered a breach of contract on the part of contract partners and,
in certain circumstances, amount to unfair practice on the part of
third persons who take advantage from the breach of contract."
In Germany, another case arose. The French firm, Paul B., manufactured lipsticks under a special process and marketed them under
the trademark "Le Rouge Baiser," which had been registered as an
international mark in the Berne Office for the Protection of Industrial
Property since 1941. On October 29, 1950, the plaintiffs, German firms,
obtained licenses from Paul B. to make those lipsticks under his
special process and to sell them in Germany under the same mark.
Prior to that date, defendant had imported into Germany a rather
large shipment of Paul B.'s original lipsticks which bore the legend
"Exportation interdite," and continued to sell them after plaintiffs
had received their license. The Court of Appeals in Hamburg, holding
for defendant, found that defendant had not imported any merchandise after October 29, 1950 and observed that plaintiffs could sue, as
Paul B.'s licensees, for infringement of the latter's trademark rights
or, in their own name, for violation of their firm name and unfair
competition. As licensees they had to be dismissed because no trademark right of Paul B. was violated by the defendant. 86 The German
85. Prins v. Grundig, reported in BIJBLAD BY DE INDUSTRIELE EIGENDOM 46
(1957), which includes the decisions of the Rechtbank of June 29, 1955, of the
Gerechtshof of March 16, 1956, of the Hoge Raad of December 14, 1956, and
an opinion of the Attorney-General. The case is discussed by Bodenhausen,
Het Grundig-arrestvan de Hoge Raad, BIJBLAD BY DE INDUSTRIELE EIGENDOM
42 (1957).
86. Judgment rendered on October 3, 1952; published in GEWERBLICHER
RECHTSSCHUTZ U. URHEBERRECHT

177 (1953).
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trademark law87 forbids only the marketing of goods to which an unlawful mark is attached but not of the genuine goods of the trademark owner and the legend "Exportation interdite" is not material
on the question of trademark infringement. On their own, on the
other hand, plaintiffs had no cause of action because defendant's acts
were committed prior to the date of their license contract.
In Switzerland and Belgium the lot of the trademark owner is
somewhat happier. Plaintiff, the Sunlight A.G. in Olten, Switzerland,
owned the trademark "Lux" for toilet soap. The New York Company,
Lever Brothers Company, which belongs to the same concern, also
makes and sells toilet soap under the mark "Lux." The defendant,
Migros Consumers organization in Zurich, imported American "Lux"
soap into the Swiss market. Plaintiff was successful before the Swiss
Bundesgericht after the Handelsgericht Zurich had dismissed the
complaint. The question was whether, under article 24(c) of the
Swiss Trademark Act, the importation of goods bearing the genuine
trademark amounted to trademark infringement. The Bundesgericht
answered in the affirmative on the ground that the Swiss trademark
owner enjoys the exclusive right to use the mark in Swiss territory.88
Neither the American trademark owner nor a third had the right to
sell goods bearing the identical American trademark in Switzerland.
The court also adverted to the fact that, although plaintiff was
legally an independent enterprise, it, like the New York company,
was part of the Unilever Concern so that both companies were "related" companies within the meaning of section 5 of the Lanham
Act and article 6Bis of the Swiss Trade Mark Act.89 Under article 6Bis,
the Unilever Concern could have required all its related firms to
register their identical marks in Switzerland in which case all the
foreign firms with registered marks in Switzerland would have had
the right to import their goods into that country. This the Unilever
Concern had not done. Thus article 6Bis replaces the principle of universality with the principle of territoriality.
The next case concerned the Belgian Tribunal de Commerce de
Namur. Plaintiff, the Swiss owner of the mark "Nescaf6" for coffee
concentrate, registered in the Berne Office for the Protection of
Industrial Property, sued Belgian defendants for the importation of
that concentrate under the same mark from Great Britain into Belgium. On the claim of its international registration, plaintiff enjoyed
protection of its mark in all countries which are members of the
Arrangement of Madrid for the international registration of marks,
87. WZG § 24.
88. Decision of the Bundesgericht of February 12, 1952, reported in BGE
78 II 164; published also in Revue Internationale de la Propri6t6 industriefle
et artistique (RIPIA) 94 (1956).
89. Both provisions owe their existence to the Paris Convention, Art. 5C,
para. 3. Cf. 4 CALLMANN at 2218.
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i.e., inBelgium, but not in Great Britain. In Great Britain the mark
was owned by a related company, Nestle Company, Ltd. The Tribunal
de Commerce de Namur held that the defendants were not allowed
to import goods, lawfully marked in Great Britain, into Belgium and
thereby violated plaintiff's exclusive right to use the mark "Nescaf6"
in Belgium.90
The last comment of the Belgian court presents our first fundamental problem. Is it true that the sale of genuine trademarked goods in
a manner that is contrary to the intentions of the trademark owner
amounts to trademark infringement? This quesion can be answered
from two different levels. First, by construing the statutory law of
trademarks and second, by searching the nature of the trademark.
The statutory laws, especially in the United States, consider infringement to be any use of a trademark by another which is likely to confuse or deceive purchasers with respect to the origin of the goods so
marked.9' Here we face our first hurdle. When, as in the Sunlight and
Nescaf6 cases,92 the several companies of an international concern in
different countries make and sell the same goods under the same
mark and the purchasers in one country buy the trademarked goods
in the belief that they come from a local factory, although in fact
they come from a foreign factory, they are, of course, "deceived"
but not in the meaning of the trademark law. On the contrary, by
93
allowing concurrent use of the same mark by related companies
the law accepts the economic facts of life, and the collective responsibility of the several related companies, especially if they are-though
independent legal entities-in fact parts of an economic entity, e.g.,
a concern. These parts must assume responsibility for each other and
are not free to ignore the economic link between them, according to
will or whim or as it may be profitable in a certain case.
The nature of the trademark as the test of infringement makes it
necessary to refer to the formula which recognizes that the trademark serves three distinct and separate purposes: (1) It identifies the
products and its origin; (2) it guarantees the product's unchanged
quality; and (3) it advertises the product. Injury to the trademark
in any of its capacities as an identifying, guaranteeing, or advertising
94
device should suffice to constitute an infringement thereof.
90. Judgment rendered on June 2, 1955, published in RIPIA 91 (1956).
Compare this decision with the Swiss case, supra, note 88.
91. See, e.g., Champion Paper & Fibre Co. v. Nat1 Ass'n of Mut. Ins. Agents,
115 U.S.P.Q. 210 (D.C. Cir. 1957), affirming 148 F. Supp. 123 (D.D.C. 1957):
"The remedy for trademark infringement provided in § 32 of the Lanham
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1952), is limited to infringement which is
likely to cause confusion or mistake: to deceive purchasers as to the origin
of the goods or services." See also 3 CALLMANN § 84.
92. See notes 88, 90 supra.
93. See Lanham Act § 5.
94. See 3 CALLMANN § 65.
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To the extent that the trademark identifies a product and its origin,
it will be victimized by any infringement. In its other functions, infringement does not similarly affect the mark. The function of guarantee, for example, can be destroyed by the trademark owner himself.
What is referred to as a guarantee is neither a guarantee nor a warranty in the legal sense. It reflects the consciousness of both seller and
buyer that a trademark may prove either advantageous or ruinous.
Deterioration in the quality of a trademarked item is directly attributable to the maker through the trademark. When the mark serves an
advertising function, it relies upon uniqueness or distinctiveness and
this can, of course, be affected by similar marks even when used only
in connection with non-competitive goods. In this type of case, we
see the attrition of a mark through dilution; 95 protection against this
hazard is now being granted by some courts and relief has recently
been made more effective by statute in a number of states.96
The trademark, however, is not merely a technical device to
achieve these functional advantages; it is much more. When we characterize the trademark as a symbol, we mean that its appearance on
the market reflects on the owner in a number of ways, that is, his
skill as a producer, his method of doing business in general, and the
manner in which his goods move in the channels of distribution. When,
for instance, the public has been led to believe that a particular item
has been fair-traded-and many housewives prefer a system of uniform prices fixed by the trademark owner to a profusion of varying
prices-price cutting will reflect adversely upon the manufacturer's
selling system. In addition, when dealers have been led to expect that
a manufacturer will be selling only through certain outlets of distribution, to the exclusion of all others, the sale of the manufacturer's
goods by any excluded outlet, whether it be a retailer, a chain or
department store or a discount house, adversely reflects upon the
manufacturer's selling system and inferentially suggests that he is
guilty of a contractual breach.
When the manufacturer's licensees are the exclusive distributors
for certain territories, the sudden appearance of an outsider in a
franchised territory will necessarily disturb the contractual relationship between licensor and the particular licensee, and maybe all other
licensees as well. In the traditional and technical trademark infringement case, the trademark as a device and business asset of the owner
is alone at risk. In these cases, however, the threat extends to the
continuance of the trademark owner's business as such. We must,
therefore, recognize that a trademark, by its existence and use in
95. 3 id. § 84.2.
96. See, e.g., GA.

CODE ANN. § 106-301 (1956); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 140, § 9(a)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1957); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 110, § 8 (1954); N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAw

§ 361(a).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 11

trade, creates a peculiar economic constellation, a special nexus between the owner and his dealers or distributors, or, if you will, a
relationship of reciprocal rights and duties, born out of the interests
of both in creating, preserving and expanding the public's demand for
the trademarked article. 97 It is intellectual myopia, attributable to
what this writer once called monopolophobia, 98 to ignore this peculiar
relationship. When trademark problems are made subservient to
such legal aspects of the law of sales as the passing of title,99 there
is obviously complete blindness to the economic undercurrents of a
phenomenon which should no longer puzzle lawyers and economists.
The passage of title to the trademarked product does not end the
relationship of the trademark owner to it; he must retain the right to
protect the integrity of the mark and the integrity of his business
organization, both of which are symbolized and identified by the mark,
and both of which can be destroyed by any use inimical to the owner's
business intentions. This highlights the real issue in the cases discussed above. Whether or not the disturbing acts qualify as technical
trademark infringement is unimportant. The more perceptive question is whether they are tortious acts and as such detrimental to the
trademark owner's distributive system or even to his entire business
organization.
Analyzing the problem from this point of view, it does not suffice
to recognize a "license" granted by the trademark owner, subject to
revocation if the "licensee" uses the trademarked product as a lossleader, misrepresents it to a purchaser, attempts to divert prospective
trade to the purchase of other goods, or sells below its fair-trade
price.100
Another more far-reaching approach was recently adopted by the
New York Supreme Court. 10 1 An exclusive United States distributor
for the German-made "Grundig" dictating and transcribing machines
had, at great expense, created a domestic market for the improved
German trademarked machine. The distributor sought a temporary
injunction against a third party who was selling inferior Grundig
machines which he had bought on the open market in Europe. The
court, relying in major part upon the decision in Metropolitan Opera
Ass'n, Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 102 granted the injunction
97. On the principle of reciprocity in the law of resale price maintenance,
see 1 CALLMANN § 24.3 (c).
98. See 5 id. at 2942.
99. See General Elec. Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 244 F.2d 681 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 824 (1957).
100. On this basis the American Fair Trade Council, Inc., advocated an
"antimonopoly" amendment to the Lanham Act.
101. De Jur-Amsco Corp. v. Janrus Camera, Inc., 155 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Sup.
Ct. 1956).
102. 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), ajfd 279 App. Div.
632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't 1951).
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"on the basis of interference with plaintiff's property rights." Defendant's conduct was held to interfere with plaintiff's "enjoyment of
the benefits of its exclusive contract as plainly as if defendant ... had
persuaded... the manufacturer to break its contract with ... plaintiff."'1 03 It seems clear that the result would have been the same even
if the machines imported into plaintiff's exclusive territory had not
been inferior. The court is in accord with the doctrine recognized in
American and English law that "contract rights are property, and as
such are entitled to the protection of the law;" that a contract "not
only binds the parties to it by the obligation entered into, but also
imposes on all the world the duty of respecting that contractual obligation."'1 4 It seems equally clear that the court would have reached
the same result even had the manufacturer brought the action. The
protection of the latter's business organization, which may consist of
a net of contractual obligations (similar to a resale price maintenance
structure),105 dictates some control over those who help in marketing the goods and those who try to disturb him. Such control should
have no limitations beyond those required by the antitrust laws. It
is commonplace that, absent monopoly, a manufacturer is free to
refuse to deal with anyone. Approaching the problem e majore ad
minorem, it could well be argued that if one is free to reject a deal in
its entirety he is equally free to reject certain terms of a deal or to
impose certain conditions upon it, e.g., fair trade prices, dates of sale
(important for magazines), territorial limitations and contractual
devices necessary to protect distributors in their territories.
So long as other goods are available to the public which- are usable
for the same general purpose, or to put it differently, so long as the
manufacturer's goods are in free and open competition with others,
and there is no collusive or conspiratorial scheme to create a monopoly
or a restraint of trade of which the manufacturer's action is a part,
the manufacturer's business organization should be protected against
disturbing elements.
103. De Jur-Amsco Corp. v.

(Sup. Ct. 1956).

Janrus Camera, Inc., 155 N.Y.S.2d 123, 125

"And today there is no question but that there may be

prima facie liability for interference with contract relations without inducing

breach of contract by, for example, injuring persons under contract so that
they are disabled from performing, or by destroying or damaging property
which is the subject matter of a contract, or by doing other acts which make
performance more burdensome, difficult or impossible or of less or no value to
the one entitled to performance." Ibid., quoting from Carpenter, Interference
with ContractRelations, 41 HARv. L. REV. 728, 731-32 (1928).
104. Second Nat'1 Bank v. M. Samuel & Sons, Inc., 12 F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 273 U.S. 720 (1926). A noncompetitive case, quoting in part from
Temperton v. Russell [1893] 1 Q.B. 715, 730. For other cases, see 2 CALLmANN,
at 623, n. 68.
105. German law developed the protection of the business organization as a
property right on the basis of section 823 of the Civil Code.
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